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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR 
SILENCE TO IMPEACH THE 
TESTIMONY OF CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself."1 An arresting officer must 
generally inform an accused of this right by delivering the Mi-
randa warning. 2 The criminal defendant may invoke the right to 
remain silent throughout custodial interrogation and in a wide 
variety of judicial proceedings, 3 including the prior severed trial 
of a codefendant. 4 If, however, the defendant later chooses to 
testify at his own trial and offers an alibi, an exculpatory expla-
nation, or a mitigating excuse, the prosecutor may seek to im-
peach the defendant's testimony by characterizing the prior si-
lence as an inconsistent statement. 
A number of constitutional and evidentiary hurdles restrict a 
prosecutor's use of such silence. Although the Supreme Court 
has found that a defendant may, under certain circumstances, 
waive fifth amendment protection,'1 it has also determined that 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), mandates that before custodial interroga-
tion an individual must be advised that "he has the right to remain silent, that anything 
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to ... an attor-
ney .... " 384 U.S. at 478-79. Without this warning, the police are typically barred from 
using an arrestee's confessions against him as evidence of a crime. There are of course 
exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) 
(holding that a threat to public safety outweighs necessity of giving Miranda warnings). 
3. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile proceedings); Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police interrogations); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) 
(congressional investigations); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (civil proceed-
ings); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury proceedings). 
4. Although the use of severed trials for codefendants in criminal cases may be in-
creasing, support for this proposition is elusive because state trial courts rarely publish 
opinions and severence is seldom an issue on appeal. Moreover, few severed trials occur 
in federal criminal cases. See LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file, search: severed trial and 
criminal; date aft 1980 (10 severed criminal trials); 1981 (11); 1982 (18); 1983 (15); 1984 
(14). 
5. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926) (finding waiver of fifth amendment 
protection for impeachment when defendant testifies at his own trial). 
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the use of this prior silence to impeach the defendant may some-
times violate due process. 6 Thus, two constitutional safeguards, 
the right against self-incrimination and the right to due process, 
limit the prosecutor's use of a defendant's prior silence. When a 
court finds that the defendant has waived fifth amendment pro-
tection and that due process concerns do not bar impeachment, 
it must then determine the admissibility of the prior silence by 
applying evidentiary rules to the facts of the case. These rules 
weigh the probative value of the silence against its prejudicial 
effects. Unfortunately, courts have largely ignored these consti-
tutional and evidentiary principles when presented with the is-
sue of impeachment by post-Miranda silence.7 
This Note focuses on whether a defendant who was called as a 
witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant and refused 
to testify by invoking the fifth amendment can subsequently be 
impeached by this silence at his own trial. In addition to the 
obvious implications this issue has for severed criminal trials, 
the factors considered when deciding whether impeachment by 
silence should be allowed generally are in sharpest focus in this 
factual setting. Thus, the analysis of the constitutional and evi-
dentiary questions this Note enlists to argue that impeachment 
by silence in this context is permissible applies as well to other 
situations involving impeachment by post-Miranda silence. 
Part I examines the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination and the waiver of that privilege by a defendant who 
voluntarily testifies at his own trial. Part II addresses the scope 
of the fourteenth amendment due process protection against the 
admission of certain government-induced silence. Part III then 
argues that the federal evidentiary rules and, by analogy, state 
evidentiary rules should allow the prosecutor to impeach the de-
fendant by using defendant's silence at the prior severed trial of 
a codefendant. In the process, the argument suggests relevant 
6. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (finding use for impeachment purposes of a 
defendant's silence immediately following Miranda warnings a violation of due process). 
7. Many courts faced with the issue of impeachment by post-Miranda silence bar 
impeachment on federal constitutional grounds without considering factual distinctions 
in the cases relied upon for precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 
F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1978) (overlooking that the case relied upon, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610 (1976), involved silence immediately following the Miranda warnings, whereas 
the case at bar involved silence long after the Miranda warnings); see also infra note 65. 
Other courts similarly misplace reliance on United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), to 
conclude that post-arrest silence is too ambiguous to be admissible. See, e.g., Webb v. 
State, 347 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (ignoring that the defendant in 
Hale received Miranda warnings whereas Webb did not), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 986 
(1977); see also infra note 56. 
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factors for courts to consider when deciding post-Miranda si-
lence impeachment issues. 
I. FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AND THE Raffel WAIVER 
RULE 
The Constitution's framers adopted the fifth amendment pro-
tection against self-incrimination to prevent compulsory admis-
sion of guilt at one's own trial, like that which occurred in the 
Star Chamber inquisitions.8 The fifth amendment now applies to 
a wide variety of proceedings, both formal and informal, other 
than one's own trial. 9 The Supreme Court has extended the fifth 
amendment to such proceedings because "an inability to protect 
the right at one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation 
useless at a later stage. "10 
This rationale would also seem to justify affording fifth 
amendment protection to a defendant who is compelled, under 
threat of legal sanction, 11 to testify at the prior, severed trial of a 
8. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974); Morgan, The Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949). 
The purposes of the fifth amendment are: 
(1) the deterrence of torture and other forms of outright coercion, be they physi-
cal or mental; (2) the enhancement of human dignity by sparing guilty defen-
dants the unhappy choice between harmful disclosure, contempt, or perjury; (3) 
the assurance of fairness in criminal procedure by cultivating a proper relation-
ship between citizens and their government-or more precisely, by requiring the 
prosecution to develop and prove a criminal case without help from the defen-
dant, and by leaving citizens free from interference until a significant measure of 
independent proof has been collected; and (4) the protection of free expression 
and association by placing a potent weapon against vaguely directed, roving in-
quiries into the hands of dissident citizens. 
Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. Califor-
nia After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841, 848-49 (1980) (emphasis in original) (foot-
notes omitted); see also 8 J. WJGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
9. See supra note 3. 
10. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974). 
11. Whether called by the codefendant or the prosecutor, a defendant is legally com-
pelled to take the stand as a witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant. Compul-
sion is especially pronounced when the defendant has been subpoenaed. It may be im-
proper, however, for_ either the codefendant or the prosecutor to utilize the state's power 
to compel a defendant to take the stand. See State v. Nott, 234 Kan. 34, 53, 669 P.2d 
660, 676 (1983) (finding error for prosecutor, who knows the witness will invoke the fifth 
amendment privilege, to compel witness to take the stand); State v. Crumm, 232 Kan. 
254, 654 P.2d 417 (1982) (barring either prosecutor or defense counsel from calling a 
witness he knows will claim the fifth amendment privilege); cf. DeLuna v. United States, 
308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1956) (holding that when two defendants are jointly tried, a defen-
dant cannot compel a codefendant to testify); United States v. Housing Found., 176 F.2d 
665 (3d Cir. 1949) (same). 
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codefendant.12 Consequently, if called to the stand, the defen-
dant should be able to refuse to testify at the codef endant's trial 
by "taking the fifth." If, however, a prosecutor can later use this 
refusal to testify as an inconsistent statement when the defen-
dant elects to testify at his own trial, then arguably some "testi-
mony" has been compelled.13 Therefore, prior silence construed 
12. The fifth amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination should ap-
ply to a defendant called to the stand at his codefendant's prior trial because that trial is 
substantially his own. When the fifth amendment was adopted, the practice of severing 
trials was unknown, and codefendants were tried together in the same proceeding. Logi-
cally, the uncontemplated procedure of severing should not be used to circumvent the 
underlying policy of the fifth amendment, where the defendant is charged with the same 
crime and faces the same evidence as his codefendant. If, however, the defendant is not 
charged or suspected of the same crime, a different result might be reached. Compare 
State v. Dodson, 222 Kan. 519, 565 P.2d 291 (1977) (barring use of silence from an asser-
tion of the fifth amendment at a prior unrelated trial), with Viereck v. United States, 
139 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir.) (permitting impeachment by defendant's silence from an asser-
tion of the fifth amendment at a prior unrelated trial), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944). 
Federal courts have taken three approaches in determining whether a defendant in the 
first severed trial may call a codefendant to the stand where the defendant's counsel 
knows the codefendant will assert the fifth amendment privilege. One view gives the 
judge discretion to decline to call the witness if the fifth amendment is likely to be in-
voked for most relevant testimony. See United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264, 1268 n.7 (5th 
Cir. 1977). This approach is premised on the rationale that "[n]either side has the right 
to benefit from any inferences the jury may draw simply from the witness' assertion of 
the privilege." United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir.· 1973). Finding 
that the fifth amendment is a privilege of refusal and not a prohibition of inquiry, some 
federal courts require the witness to take the stand and invoke the privilege for specific 
questions. See, e.g., United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting 
that since a nonparty witness is not on trial, invocation of the fifth amendment privilege 
is not being used against him); United States v. Stephens, 492 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir.) (find-
ing that a defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him, so he can call a 
witness to the stand to invoke the privilege), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974). Other 
federal courts have determined that the defendant cannot call a codefendant to the 
stand when the defendant's counsel knows that the codefendant will assert the fifth 
amendment privilege because jurors may draw improper inferences from the refusal to 
testify. See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908-09 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). 
13. Of course, this silence is an odd type of testimony, because it only becomes "testi-
mony" upon the subsequent fulfillment of a condition, namely that the defendant, called 
as a witness at the prior trial of a codefendant, takes the stand at his own trial. Because 
it is the defendant himself who, by testifying at his own trial, has turned his silence into 
"testimony," perhaps there is no government compulsion. As one judge expressed it: 
That one may remain silent in the face of accusation is a personal option, and 
a constitutional privilege. There is a difference, however, between silence and 
compulsion. Compulsion is never permissible. Silence is a choice, a choice de-
pending upon the facts and circumstances, that may contain risks. 
The majority confuses compulsion with "silence." There is a constitutional 
protection against compulsion, silence is a choice and a waivable privilege. So 
long as one maintains silence, we must, as far as possible, protect it from unfa-
vorable inference. When one chooses to speak, however, we owe no duty to pro-
tect against any natural inconsistency that may exist between former elected, 
self-imposed silence and trial testimony. 
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as testimony might theoretically fall within the purview of the 
fifth amendment. 14 
This theoretical analysis, however, holds little practical signifi-
cance because courts need not consider the scope of the fifth 
amendment protection in cases of impeachment by prior si-
lence. 111 In 1926, the Supreme Court, in Raff el v. United 
States, 16 held that a defendant who testifies at his own trial 
waives fifth amendment protection against the use of his prior 
silence for impeachment purposes. In that case, defendant Raffel 
refused to take the stand at his first trial, which ended in a hung 
jury. 17 At his second trial, however, he testified to refute the tes-
timony of a prosecution witness.18 The trial court questioned 
Raffel about his silence at the earlier trial, 19 and the Supreme 
Court upheld this use of prior silence to impeach Raffel's testi-
Commonwealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 587, 454 A.2d 537, 541-42 (1982) (McDermott, J., 
dissenting). If, however, the defendant does not take the stand at his own trial, there is, 
of course, no testimony to impeach. Silence could then be interpreted only as substantive 
evidence. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibiting adverse prosecutorial 
comment on the defendant's failure to testify); People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 609 
(Colo. 1983) (en bane) (deciding use of silence unwarranted on evidentiary grounds). Any 
defendant who testifies at his own trial does so voluntarily because the fifth amendment 
prevents the state from compelling the defendant to take the stand. See United States v. 
Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 777 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Keenan, 267 F.2d 118, 126 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 836 (1959); DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th 
Cir. 1956); United States v. Housing Found., 176 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1949). 
14. Although the fifth amendment precludes government forced self-incrimination 
(guilt), it does not necessarily prevent self-contradiction (impeachment). See supra note 
5 and accompanying text. In prosecution immunity cases, the Supreme Court has dis-
cussed whether "testimony" is "incriminating" and thus within the scope of the fifth 
amendment protection. See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956) 
(incriminating testimony is that which "may possibly expose [the witness] to a criminal 
charge.") The Supreme Court has, however, implicitly accepted the idea that impeach-
ment constitutes a form of incrimination; otherwise, there would be no need to create a 
waiver rule to permit impeachment. See Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), 
discussed infra notes 16-34 and accompanying text. Thus, arguments regarding the theo-
retical scope of fifth amendment protection notwithstanding, the Raffel waiver rule al-
lows impeachment. 
15. Jenkins u. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), expressly avoided deciding whe_ther 
pre-arrest silence falls within the scope of the fifth amendment protection because it 
found that Raffel rendered the question moot. 447 U.S. at 236 n.2. If pre-arrest silence 
were within the scope of the fifth amendment, then under Raffel the defendant would 
waive that protection when testifying at his own trial. So, whether or not silence is 
within the scope of the fifth amendment, the outcome is the same: impeachment is 
permissible. · 
16. 271 U.S. 494 (1926). 
17. 271 U.S. at 495. 
18. The government tried Raffel for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition 
Act. The prosecution's witness, a prohibition agent, testified at both trials that after the 
agent had searched the tavern, Raffel admitted owning it. Raffel, 271 U.S. at 494. 
19. 271 U.S. at 494. 
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mony.20 Thus, the Raffel waiver rule permits impeachment when 
a defendant who invoked21 the fifth amendment in a prior judi-
cial proceeding voluntarily takes the stand at his own trial.22 Al-
though several Justices, in 1957, speculated that Raff el had been 
implicitly overruled or limited by subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions,23 the Court, in 1980, explicitly reaffirmed Raffel in 
20. 271 U.S. at 497-99. 
21. In deciding fifth amendment or due process issues, the Court has never distin-
guished between passive assertion (silence), as in Raff el, and active assertion of the fifth 
amendment. In Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), the defendant invoked 
the fifth amendment as a witness before his grand jury, but answered the same questions 
at his trial. When considering the constitutional implications, the Court seemed willing 
to apply Raff el to an active assertion of the fifth amendment, but instead ruled to ex-
clude the invocation of the fifth amendment for evidentiary reasons. Likewise, in Stewart 
v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961), the Court relied on Grunewald to find that the de-
fendant's failure to testify at his first two trials, but not at his third, lacked probative 
value sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect. Again, the Court found it irrelevant 
that Raffel involved passive silence. These cases imply that the Court equates passive 
silence with an active assertion of the fifth amendment. 
22. The Eleventh Circuit Court has noted: 
Once [defendant] took the stand voluntarily to testify in his own behalf, he 
waived the Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to answer questions properly 
within the scope of cross-examination under Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Under this rule, a witness may be cross-examined as to matters "rea-
sonably related" to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters 
affecting credibility. 
United States v. Pilcher, 672 F.2d 875, 877-78 (11th Cir.) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982); see also Neely v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1261, 1264 
(7th Cir. 1983) (allowing the prosecutor to question defendant on matters reasonably 
related to the subject matter of his direct examination, including impeaching defendant's 
credibility), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 
1342 (9th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); United States v. 
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 907 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (same, but issue not decided, 
only discussed), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). Defendant's "voluntary offer of testi-
mony upon any fact is a waiver as to all other relevant facts because of the necessary 
connection between all." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2276(2) (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) 
(emphasis supplied). Regardless of the scope of waiver with respect to substantive evi-
dence, impeachment evidence is always within the scope of the waiver. 
23. In a concurring opinion in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), Jus-
tice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan, stated 
that "to the extent that approval of such a rule in [Raffel] has vitality after [Johnson], I 
think the Ratfel case should be explicitly overruled." Id. at 426; see also Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 338 n.9 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part, joined by Mar-
shall, J.). 
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943), did not affect Ratfel because Johnson 
did not involve a waiver situation. In Johnson, the defendant testified at his own trial, 
and during cross-examination the trial court improperly permitted the defendant to re-
main silent under the fifth amendment. Although the prosecutor sought to use this si-
lence to impeach the defendant, the Supreme Court would not permit impeachment. 
Because the defendant did not follow his silence with further testimony that could be 
interpreted as an implied waiver, the effect was as if Johnson had taken the stand only 
to assert his fifth amendment right to remain silent. See also United States v. Klinger, 
136 F.2d 677, 678 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (finding that Johnson does not limit Ratfel 
because Johnson only applies when the judge erroneously grants the privilege on cross-
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Jenkins v. Anderson.2" 
examination), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 746 (1943). 
Defendants have repeatedly attempted to distinguish Raffel from Grunewald because 
Raff el involved silence at a prior trial, whereas Grunewald involved silence before a 
grand jury. Courts, however, have rejected this distinction. See, e.g., Berra v. United 
States, 221 F.2d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 1955) (upholding the Raffel rule because "we discern 
nothing unjust or unfair in this rule" and allowing impeachment by commenting on de-
fendant's assertion of the fifth amendment at his grand jury proceeding), aff'd on other 
grounds, 351 U.S. 131 (1956); United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir.) 
(same), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 860 (1948); Viereck v. United States, 139 F.2d 847, 858 
(D.C. Cir. 1944) (same), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944); Tomlinson v. United States, 93 
F.2d 652, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (allowing impeachment by comment about defendant's 
failure to testify before his grand jury), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 646 (1938); State v. 
Schroeder, 201 Kan. 811, 820-21, 443 P.2d 284, 292 (1968) (same as Berra), limited in 
State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 730, 556 P.2d 387 (1976). Because Grunewald is distin-
guishable, it does not limit Raff el. The Raff el rule is merely a broad constitutional waiver 
test. Grunewald, however, was decided on the evidentiary theory that the prior silence 
was consistent with defendant's later testimony; therefore, impeachment could not be 
allowed. 353 U.S. at 418-24. Thus, even after a defendant takes the stand at his own 
trial, opening himself up to impeachment under the Raff el constitutional waiver rule, the 
prosecutor may not impeach the defendant unless the prior silence and subsequent testi-
mony are inconsistent under the Grunewald evidentiary test. As the Grunewald Court 
noted: 
We may assume that under Raffel, [the defendant] in this case [Grunewald] was 
subject to cross-examination impeaching credibility just like any other witness, 
and that his Fifth Amendment plea before the grand jury could not carry over 
any form of immunity when he voluntarily took the stand at the trial. This does 
not, however, solve the question whether ... [the] probative value ... was so 
negligible as to be far outweighed by its possible impermissible impact on the 
jury. 
353 U.S. at 420 (footnote omitted); see also Note, What You Do Not Say Can and Will 
Be Used Against You: Prearrest Silence Used to Impeach a Defendant's Testimony, 16 
VAL. U.L. REV. 537, 543 n.41 (1982) (noting the difference between the Raffel constitu-
tional issue and the Grunewald evidentiary issue). Although the Grunewald Court in-
ferred that Raffel did not consider the question of inconsistency, 353 U.S. at 420, the 
Court later pointed out in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 175 (1975) that Raffel 
assumed inconsistency. Therefore, any confusion in the law arises from the failure to 
distinguish between the Raffel constitutional waiver rule and the Grunewald evidentiary 
test. 
24. 447 U.S. 231, 237 n.4 (1980). The Jenkins Court stated: "In fact, no Court opin-
ion decided since Raffel has challenged its holding that the Fifth Amendment is not 
violated when a defendant is impeached on the basis of his prior silence." 447 U.S. at 237 
n.4. No case since Jenkins has reconsidered Raffel. "However much Raffel has been cir-
cumscribed and criticized, it has not been overruled, notwithstanding that the Court has 
had several opportunities to do so." Culhane v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 746, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). See also United States ex rel. Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.) 
(noting that Raffel was resuscitated by Jenkins), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983). 
Without reference to Raffel itself, one pre-Jenkins commentator asserted that 
the Court should hold that a defendant who waives the privilege at one stage [of 
the judicial process] does not retroactively waive the privilege for all previous 
stages . . . . As long as fair cross-examination is allowed in the proceeding in 
which the waiver takes place, there is no reason to permit the use of prior silence 
Saltzburg, The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and 
Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 204, 205 n.381 (1980). This analysis, which effectively 
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Sound policy considerations support the Raf/el waiver rule. 
These considerations can be demonstrated by examining the two 
ways the waiver rule may affect a defendant. First, the rule may 
affect the defendant's decision to testify at his own trial. 25 The 
defendant, for example, might not testify for fear that the prose-
cutor will use the prior invocation of the fifth amendment privi-
lege at a codefendant's trial for impeachment purposes.26 The 
defendant's decision to testify at his own trial, however, would 
be only a tactical choice that would receive no constitutional 
protection.27 Second, the waiver rule may affect the defendant's 
decision to assert the privilege in the initial proceeding. The de-
fendant, fearing impeachment if he later testifies at his own 
trial, may be discouraged from "taking the fifth" at a codefen-
dant's prior trial. The Constitution, however, does not forbid 
"every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that 
has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional 
rights."28 Instead, the "threshold question is whether compelling 
the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies 
behind the rights involved."29 Because the Raf/el Court found 
that the waiver rule did not appreciably impair any fifth amend-
ment policies, the defendant's decision about whether to invoke 
the fifth amendment at his codefendant's trial should likewise 
receive no constitutional protection. ao 
Analysis of the two possible effects of the Raf/el waiver rqle 
on a defendant suggests that the state's strong interest in pro-
moting the truth-finding function of the adversary system31 
rejects Ra/fel, fails to recognize that any witness taking the stand subjects his credibility 
to attack as part of a "fair cross-examination." To allow otherwise would allow the de-
fendant, who has the most at stake and thus the strongest incentive to lie, to avoid the 
traditional function of cross-examination-testing a witness's veracity. 
25. The defendant creates this first burden by deciding to testify at his own trial. 
Consequently, the waiver rule puts the defendant in the same position as that of a defen-
dant impeached by prior bad acts or prior convictions. See FED. R. Evrn. 404(b), 609. 
26. See Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Ar-
rest Silence, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 940, 955 (1975) (noting the two potential burdens placed 
on a defendant by Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974), which permitted 
impeachment by post-Miranda silence). Allowing impeachment by silence may also en-
tice prosecutors to call defendants to testify at preliminary hearings and before grand 
juries. Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 204. Evidentiary rules, however, may curb such 
behavior. 
27. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980). 
28. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973). 
29. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971). 
30. See Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926) ("We are unable to see that 
the rule that if he testifies, he must testify fully, adds in any substantial manner to the 
inescapable embarrassment which the accused must experience in determining whether 
he shall testify or not."). 
31. "Truth is the essential objective of our adversary system of justice." United 
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dominates the fifth amendment proscription against compelled 
self-incrimination.32 In effect, the Raffel waiver rule provides 
that a defendant "could not become a witness for himself with-
out becoming equally a witness against himself ... subject to all 
legitimate and proper cross-examination."33 Thus, the defendant 
who chooses to cast aside his constitutional right to remain si-
lent must speak truthfully and subject himself to the traditional 
truth-testing function of cross-examination.34 
II. DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON IMPEACHMENT BY SILENCE 
Although a defendant who chooses to testify at his trial waives 
fifth amendment protection, the fourteenth amendment's gen-
eral guarantee of "fairness"35 may still pose a federal constitu-
tional barrier to impeachment by silence.36 The Supreme Court 
has held that fairness bars the government from impeaching a 
defendant's testimony with the very silence that the government 
implicitly induced. 37 In Doyle v. Ohio, 38 the Court found that 
Miranda warnings constitute an affirmative government act that 
implicitly assures the defendant that his silence will not be used 
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). 
32. The Beechum court stated: 
[When the defendant takes the stand,] "the interests of the [government] and 
regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become rele-
vant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and 
limits of the privilege against self-incrimination." ... [T]he government is enti-
tled to subject his testimony to the acid test of adverse cross examination. 
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Brown v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958) (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). 
33. Hinton, Comment on Recent Cases, 21 ILL. L. REV. 396, 398 (1926) (commenting 
on Raffel). 
34. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
35. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held that a prosecutor could not 
use a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence to impeach his credibility at his own 
trial. The Court relied on due process and evidentiary grounds, rather than the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to reach this decision. As one court 
noted, "Doyle reviewed a state conviction, and was grounded on the Fourteenth, not the 
Fifth, Amendment. The court referred to the [Miranda] warnings as being a prophylac-
tic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights." People v. Free, 131 Cal. App. 3d 
155, 162, 182 Cal. Rptr. 259, 262 (1982). 
36. A state constitutional due process clause may be an even greater barrier to im-
peachment by silence than the federal due process clause. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 422 So. 
2d 928, 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (barring impeachment by silence by interpreting 
the state due process clause as broader than the federal); see also infra note 75. 
37. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976). Of course, the defendant must not 
only be induced to remain silent, but actually remain silent, to receive the due process 
protection of Doyle. See, e.g., Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980). 
38. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
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against him.39 Similarly, in Johnson v. United States,"0 the 
Court applied this elementary fairness standard to prohibit the 
impeachment use of a defendant's silence that resulted from the 
trial court erroneously granting a fifth amendment privilege dur-
ing the cross-examination of the defendant."1 
A. The "Affirmative Government Inducement" Standard 
With an erroneous grant of the fifth amendment privilege in 
Johnson and Miranda warnings in Doyle as their only guides, 
courts have struggled to determine what constitutes affirmative 
government inducement. Because Miranda warnings do not cre-
ate the right to remain silent but merely serve to ensure that an 
arrestee fully understands that right,"2 some courts have con-
cluded that arrest, not the Miranda warnings, represents the 
government inducement of silence.43 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, rejected this view in Fletcher v. Weir;'" by allowing im-
peachment by post-arrest, pre-Miranda warnings silence.0 
39. Id. 
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that 
silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who re-
ceives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair 
and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used 
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
40. 318 U.S. 189 (1943); see supra note 23. 
41. 318 U.S. at 197. 
42. "[T]he right to silence described in those [Miranda] warnings derives from the 
Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to it." Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560 
(1980); see also New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631 (1984) ("The prophylactic 
Miranda warnings are therefore not themselves rights protected by the Constitu-
tion ... ") (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). 
43. See Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 
(1982); People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174,400 N.E.2d 342,424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980) (here-
inafter cited as Conyers I), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 809 (1980), on remand, 52 
N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 933, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Conyers II); 
People v. Beller, 74 Ill. 2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857 (1979). 
44. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam). On remand, the Sixth Circuit directed dismissal 
of the case without prejudice because there was no evidence that the defendant had 
received the Miranda warning. 680 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1982). 
45. See also Conyers II, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 933, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1981) 
(barring impeachment only on evidentiary grounds). People v. Free, 131 Cal. App. 3d 
155, 182 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1982), however, suggests that Fletcher promotes police mis-
conduct. After arrest, the police could delay giving Miranda warnings to obtain post-
arrest silence for impeachment purposes, and then give Miranda warnings so that if the 
arrestee does talk it will be admissible as substantive evidence. See United States v. 
Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1101 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that the police delay in giving 
the Miranda warnings was not intentional, but cautioning against creating an impeach-
ment rule that would act as an incentive for deliberate delay). But see Harris v. New 
SPRING 1985] Admissibility of Prior Silence 751 
Thus, by itself, an affirmative government act, such as an arrest, 
has been deemed insufficient to trigger due process protections."6 
Fletcher implies that the fifth amendment itself does not con-
stitute government inducement sufficient to arouse due process 
concerns," even though an arrested person may know of and 
rely on the right to remain silent, without having received Mi-
randa warnings."8 Jenkins v. Anderson"9 bolsters this implica- · 
tion. Because Jenkins involved pre-arrest silence, the fifth 
amendment guarantee could have been the only possible govern-
ment inducement. But, consistent with the Fletcher implication, 
the Court held that this passive governmental assurance of the 
right to remain silent did not raise a due process fairness issue. 50 
Fletcher, read together with Doyle and .Johnson,51 suggests 
that, to raise fairness concerns, an affirmative go_vernment act 
must implicitly assure the accused that his silence will not be 
used to impeach him. 52 Thus, both an affirmative government 
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). "[T]he benefits of [impeachment] should not be lost, in 
our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be 
encouraged thereby .... [S)ufficient deterence flows when the evidence in question is 
made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief."); see also Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 
174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N. Y.S.2d 402 (1980). (Meyer, J., dissenting, joined by Jasen and 
Jones, JJ.) (finding it "highly improbable" that an officer would delay the Miranda 
warnings because improper police practices are used to produce confessions not silence). 
46. See Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1981) (barring on due process 
grounds impeachment by post-arrest silence when Miranda warnings are not given), 
rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (allowing impeachment); Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 174,400 N.E.2d 
342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980) (same as Weir); Conyers II, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 933, 
438 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1981) (barring impeachment only on evidentiary grounds). 
47. The defendant Weir may have relied on both the arrest itself and the fifth 
amendment in deciding to remain silent, yet the Court held that this did not constitute 
government inducement. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam) (finding 
that arrest and the existence of the fifth amendment, without Miranda warnings, do not 
amount to government inducement to remain silent). Logically, therefore, the Court's 
decision indicates that neither reason standing alone constitutes a government induce-
ment to remain silent. 
48. See Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 174,400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980) (stating 
that the government promise embodied in the fifth amendment implying that an ac-
cused's silence will not be used against him is sufficient government inducement without 
the Miranda warnings), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 809 (1980) (remanded in light 
of Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), which suggested that the fifth amendment 
alone is not government inducement), Conyers II, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 857 (1981) 
(decided on evidentiary grounds). 
49. 447 U.S. 231 (1980). 
50. Id. at 240. 
51. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. It is also noteworthy that the si-
lence sought to be _used for impeachment in both Doyle and Johnson came immediately 
after the affirmative government act that arguably induced the silence. See Doyle, 426 
U.S. at 616 n.6; Johnson, 318 U.S. at 192-93. 
52. "In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda 
wamings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-
examination as to post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand." 
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act and an inducement to remain silent are necessary. Only 
when the defendant meets this threshold affirmative government 
inducement test need a court consider whether use of prior si-
lence for impeachment of subsequent testimony is "fair.''53 
Doyle, of course, deems "unfair" impeachment by silence that 
occurs immediately after Miranda warnings have been adminis-
tered. 54 Dictum in Doyle, however, suggests that silence occur-
ring long after the Miranda "inducement" may be used for im-
peachment. The Doyle Court noted that silence occurring days 
after arrest and Miranda warnings "present[s] different consid-
erations from . . . silence after receiving Miranda warnings at 
the time of arrest.''1111 Unfortunately, the Doyle Court failed to 
articulate what these "different considerations" might be. Simi-
larly, federal and state courts have not directly examined these 
different considerations, although many courts have found that 
such considerations justify impeachment by prior silence. 56 An 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Greene, 698 F.2d 1364, 1374 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the affirmative 
assurance implicit in the Miranda warnings triggers due process analysis). 
53. Fairness can be viewed from two perspectives. A defendant might contend that 
the government, through impeachment, is unfairly using silence it implicitly encouraged. 
The government, however, may attribute any "penalty" caused by the impeachment use 
of silence to the defendant for choosing to testify, asserting that the penalty "was not a 
consequence of [defendant's] decision to remain silent; the penalty arose only because 
the defendant took the stand." Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714, 724 (3d Cir. 1974). 
54. Some commentators have suggested that any unfairness could be eliminated by 
giving an arrestee a "silence warning"-your silence cannot be used against you to prove 
guilt, but can be used for impeachment of your credibility if you decide to testify in your 
own behalf. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REV. 77, 86 (1980) 
(citing Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 713 (1968)). But see Kamisar, Kauper's Judicial Examination of 
the Accused Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. 
REV. 15, 34 n.70 (1974) (suggesting that the police could not explain, nor could arrestees 
understand, a more complicated Miranda warning). 
55. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616 n.6 (1976). 
56. Early decisions that involved silence occurring days after Miranda warnings com-
pletely disregarded the "different considerations" and reached opposite conclusions on 
the propriety of impeachment by silence. Compare United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 
F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding, without mentioning any "different considera-
tions," impeachment of defendant's general pretrial silence a "blatant violation of 
Doyle"); People v. Eliason, 117 Ill. App. 3d 683, 453 N.E.2d 908 (1983) (same); and Peo-
ple v. Galloway, 100 Cal. App. 3d 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1979) (same); with Franklin v. 
State, 576 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en bane) (allowing impeachment use of 
defendant's preliminary hearing silence). One commentator has criticized Franklin on 
primarily evidentiary and state procedural, not constitutional, grounds. See Note, Crimi-
nal Law-Self-Incrimination-Failure to Relate Exculpatory Story at Pretrial Hear-
ings May Be Used by Prosecution to Impeach Defendant's Testimony at Trial, 10 ST. 
MARY'S L.J. 632 (1979). 
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Rowe, 618 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980), later vacated by 
the Supreme Court sub nom. Franzen v. Smith, 449 U.S. 810 (1980), the court barred 
impeachment use of silence coming long after Miranda warnings primarily because the 
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examination of these cases, in conjunction with the underlying 
purpose of the fifth amendment privilege, suggests that the lapse 
in time following the inducement, the pressure on the accused to 
speak, and the presence of legal counsel are factors central to 
the fairness of using silence for impeachment purposes. 
silence was ambiguous on evidentiary grounds. Extending Doyle, but without delineating 
any "different considerations," the Smith court found "the fact that Miranda warnings 
are given and that a criminal defendant retains his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination is of continuing relevance to the fact of a defendant's silence throughout 
the pretrial period." 618 F.2d at 1213. On remand, the court again asserted without elab-
oration that the ambiguity of post-Miranda silence exists throughout the trial. United 
S,tates ex rel. Smith v. Franzen, 660 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit found 
it irrelevant that the post-arrest, post-Miranda silence took place when Smith was not 
under custodial interrogation. Id. at 239. Again, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh 
Circuit Court's opinion. Lane v. Smith, 457 U.S. 1102 (1982). On remand, the Seventh 
Circuit found that the trial record did not indicate that Smith had ever received the 
Miranda warnings, so, relying on Fletcher, it allowed impeachment. United States ex rel. 
Smith v. Rowe, 746 F.2d 386, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
The Seventh Circuit has also permitted impeachment by post-Miranda silence. United 
States ex rel. Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 
(1983). The Saulsbury court allowed impeachment by silence because it occurred "long 
after Miranda warnings and after circumstances had made the need for an exculpatory 
explanation, if it existed, far more compelling." 702 F.2d at 656. But the defendant in 
Saulsbury expressly claimed that he had remained silent because of the Miranda warn-
ings. 702 F.2d at 655. The court attached significance to this fact, stating that "(o]nce 
that reason was solicited upon [defense counsel's] direct examination it was not funda-
mentally unfair for the prosecution, upon cross-examination, to attack the credibility of 
that explanation .... " 702 F.2d at 655-56. Thus, had defense counsel not elicited the 
reason for silence, the court may have barred impeachment. 
In Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.$. 939 (1983), 
the court similarly allowed impeachment by silence occurring several months after ar-
rest. As in Smith, the record failed to show whether Folston ever received Miranda 
warnings. 691 F.2d at 187. This may explain why the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
because absent these warnings Fletcher would control. 
Folston raises an interesting interpretation of the scope of the term "government com-
pulsion." In Folston all of the defendants were being held in the same jail cell. When a 
codefendant asked Folston an accusatory question, Folston responded with silence. The 
court implied that there was no government compulsion since the defendant was "not 
under interrogation by, or even in the presence of, any police officer, attorney or other 
government representative." 691 F.2d at 187. This implication, however, may be under-
mined because the prosecutor permitted the codefendant in the cell who testified about 
Folston's silence to plead guilty to second degree murder in exchange for his agreement 
to testify against the other codefendants. 691 F.2d at 185. There was no evidence that 
the codefendant was a government plant, 691 F.2d at 187, yet the plea arrangement 
raises the possibility that the codefendant may have been acting as a quasi-state agent. 
Compare People v. Galloway, 100 Cal. App. 3d 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918 (1979) (find-
ing it unimportant that silence was not before a government agent), with People v. Mar-
tin, 101 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1007, 162 Cal. Rptr. 133, 137 (1980) (finding that Miranda 
warnings, upon which Doyle is founded, are required only when both custody and inter-
rogation are used by a police official). 
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B. The Role of "Different Considerations" 
1. Time- Many courts allude to a time lapse as the "differ-
ent consideration" referred to in Doyle.57 Read literally, Doyle 
says that silence occurring some time after arrest and Miranda 
warnings presents different considerations. 58 Proponents of this 
literal reading contend that, after time, silence represents a 
more careful and deliberate decision than silence immediately 
following the warning. Opponents, however, contend that the 
passage of time does not affect the strength of the implicit gov-
ernmental assurance that the accused's silence will not be used 
against him. By focusing on time alone, however, both of these 
arguments fail to recognize the importance of time not as a fac-
tor in determining the existence of "different considerations," 
but as an indication of other highly relevant factors. Miranda 
warnings are required only to inform an accused of his constitu-
tional rights when confronted with the pressures that attend 
custodial interrogation.59 The Miranda warning implicitly as-
sures an accused that under the circumstances of custodial inter-
rogation his silence will not be used against him. 60 Although the 
passage of time may not change the strength of the assurance, it 
often changes the circumstances upon which the assurance is 
predicated. Thus, it is not time itself which weakens an ac-
cused's reliance on Miranda; rather, those factors that generally 
accompany the passage of time-reduced pressure, more infor-
mation, and advice of counsel-account for the difference. 
Even though time may serve as an indicator that circum-
stances have changed, it seems wiser to consider directly the fac-
tors that may change with the passage of time. Two factors, 
whether pressure has actually been reduced and whether counsel 
has in fact been provided, form the bases for evaluating whether 
post-Miranda silence can be used for impeachment purposes. 
Moreover, to rely on time as the only factor in determining 
the fairness of using a defendant's silence for impeachment pur-
poses would produce the problems associated with all bright-line 
tests. Absent other considerations, courts would be forced to de-
cide at precisely what time the defendant's continued silence 
57. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.) 
(noting in dictum the difficulty of deciding the impeachment issue if the silence had 
been only one day after the Miranda warnings), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983). 
58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
59. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
60. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
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would lose the taint of the prior government assurance. Any 
time chosen would necessarily be arbitrary61 and might in some 
cases undermine the protection Doyle was designed to afford the 
defendant. 62 
2. Pressure- The Doyle protection springs from Miranda's 
goal of preventing the government from pressuring the accused 
into a hurried and uninformed decision to speak.63 But as the 
pressure created by arrest and custodial interrogation64 dissi-
pates and the accused becomes better informed of his constitu-
tional rights, the need for the Doyle rule diminishes. Indeed, 
custodial pressure, a primary concern of the Miranda Court, 
vanishes if the accused is released on bail.611 Nevertheless, lack of 
counsel may perpetuate the problem of uninformed decision 
making. A defendant may concede that the decision to remain 
silent long after arrest did not arise from police pressure, but 
may still maintain that it was based on the assurances implicit 
in the Miranda warnings. 
3. Legal counsel- After the defendant has received legal ad-
vice, the argument that he based his continued silence on im-
plied assurances disappears, because counsel should advise him 
of both his right to silence and the risk of later impeachment 
61. Allowing impeachment an hour, a day, or a week after Miranda warnings would 
be devoid of any policy rationale based on fairness. The Saulsbury court, for example, 
noted that had the defendant's silence been the morning after arrest and Miranda, "the 
decision would be indeed difficult." 702 F.2d at 655. 
62. A defendant may be in custody without counsel for hours or days and without 
any reduction in custodial pressure. Under these circumstances, Doyle was intended to 
prevent impeachment by silence. An arbitrary time rule might deny a defendant such 
protection. 
63. Miranda warnings are designed to inform the accused that he need not make a 
hasty, uninformed decision to confess. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
64. Custodial interrogation has two elements-custody and interrogation by a gov-
ernment official. See, e.g., Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). Absent custodial detention, 
there can be no due process violation. See Lebowitz v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 974, 977-78 
(11th Cir. 1982). Similarly, absent interrogation by a government official, impeachment 
by silence of a defendant in custody is allowed. Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184 (4th 
Cir. 1982). See supra note 56. Still, Fletcher may indicate that custodial interrogation is 
not important because the court there held that a defendant can be custodially interro-
gated without Miranda and still be impeached by his silence. 
65. Of course, the defendant's post-release silence may be ambiguous because of a 
diminished need to speak consistent with innocence. Nevertheless, evidentiary considera-
tions, not constitutional ones, should determine the probative weight of such silence. See 
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (finding no constitutional bar when a suspect is 
not in custody in a pre-arrest context). Silence in response to incriminating questions 
other than by the police still may be inconsistent enough with a defendant's subsequent 
trial testimony to permit impeachment. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 
(1975) ("Silence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation 
.... "); Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1982) (allowing impeachment 
by silence when defendant was questioned by a codefendant). 
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that silence creates. Miranda warnings are designed to promote 
a careful, unpressured, and informed decision about whether to 
remain silent; this same purpose is achieved by reducing pres-
sure and providing counsel. 
The foregoing safeguards, reduced pressure and advice of 
counsel, commonly enjoyed by the defendant by the time his co-
defendant comes to trial, make the use of prior silence for im-
peachment purposes fair. 66 Because either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor will be questioning the defendant who is called to the 
stand at his codefendant's trial, some pressure remains. This 
pressure, however, is less likely to be as continuous or harassing 
as custodial pressure. Indeed, a judge's presence assures the de-
fendant a more impartial listener than the arresting officer or 
prosecutor.67 Counsel may also be present to protect the defen-
dant from undue pressure.68 Moreover, knowing that he is likely 
to be called as a witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefen-
dant and having received legal advice from counsel, the defen-
dant makes an informed and unpressured decision long before 
the codefendant's trial. Such silence can be fairly used to 
impeach. 
A trial is designed to ascertain the truth. Use of prior silence 
to impeach a defendant's trial testimony aids in the truth-test-
ing function. Because the defendant has a critical interest in the 
outcome of his trial, he may have a great incentive to perjure 
himself or distort the facts when he testifies. Therefore, truth-
testing functions of impeachment and cross-examination should 
be applied with special vigor to assure the veracity of the defen-
dant's testimony. Allowing impeachment by silence after Mi-
randa warnings and after adequate protections have been af-
forded the defendant to assure an unpressured and intelligently 
chosen silence69 would encourage a defendant to tell his exculpa-
66. Of course, the trial judge would have to decide whether "adequate protection" 
existed before admitting silence for impeachment purposes. For examples of adequate 
protection see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
67. See Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980) (finding 
that a suspect may find it useless to justify his apparently criminal behavior to an arrest-
ing officer). 
68. See Kamisar, supra note 54, at 33 n.70 (1974) (noting that Grunewald distin-
guished grand jury and other "secret proceedings," where a person testifies without the 
advice of counsel or other procedural safeguards, from "open court proceedings"). 
69. After holding that impeachment does not violate the fifth amendment, the court 
in Neely v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1261, 1265 (7th Cir. 1983) found "no merit to the defendant's 
argument that he was denied a fair trial" (emphasis added), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 723 
(1984). This holding indicates that impeachment is "fair" in many post-arrest, post-Mi-
randa situations. 
One might argue that the fairness question disappears because the Raffel fifth amend-
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tory story sometime before his own trial. 70 This encouragement 
would enhance the fact-finding process:71 the prosecutor would 
not be surprised by previously unknown evidence, 72 and the de-
ment waiver rule also waives the due process fairness requirement. Ruffel demonstrates 
that waiver of a constitutional protection can be either implied or express, but must be 
"an intentional relinquishment ... of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Once a showing of waiver has been made, the defendant has the 
burden of proving that his waiver was not intelligently made. Moore v. Michigan, 355 
U.S. 155, 161-62 (1957). Just as a defendant who knowingly and intelligently pleads 
guilty waives his constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination, his right 
to trial by jury, his right to confront his accusers, and his right to due process, see 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (finding no waiver only because the trial 
record was inadequate to show that defendant had knowingly pleaded guilty), one could 
argue that the defendant who takes the stand at his own trial waives the fifth amend-
ment privilege against impeachment by silence as well as the fairness protections of due 
process. 
The central goal of the due process clause is that the defendant receive a fair trial. 
This general fairness goal, however, provides a weaker justification for denying waiver 
than the more specific fairness requirement, preventing compelled self-incrimination, 
embodied in the fifth amendment. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 245-46 n.10 
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, because the stronger constitutional protection is 
waived under Ruffel, the defendant may also waive the weaker general fairness protec-
tion under this rule. 
Despite the similar protections of defendant's silence intended under the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments, the Ruffel fifth amendment waiver rule has never been applied 
in a strictly due process context because seemingly different policies underlie the two 
constitutional issues. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Franzen, 660 F.2d 237, 240 (7th 
Cir. 1981) (finding that the policies underlying the due process clause are different from 
those underlying the fifth amendment, so Ruffel does not apply in a due process con-
text), vacated sub nom. Franzen v. Smith, 449 U.S. 810 (1980), on remand, 660 F.2d 237 
(7th Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. Lane v. Smith, 457 U.S. 1102 (1982), on remand sub 
nom. United States ex rel. Smith v. Rowe, 746 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); 
State v. Blevins, 7 Kan. App. 2d 378, 642 P.2d 136 (1982) (finding Ruffel waiver does not 
apply to due process claim after Doyle). But Ruffel waiver of due process was never 
before the Doyle Court, so the Blevins court's reasoning may be erroneous. 
70. This encouragement stops far short of the coercion constitutionally prohibited by 
the fifth amendment. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (noting it is 
defendant's choice to testify). 
71. This is the same policy behind notice-of-alibi-defense statutes. See FED R. CRIM. 
P. 12.l(a); Note, Constitutional Implications of Notice-of-Alibi Provisions, 21 WAYNE L. 
REv. 1415 (1975). Indeed, allowing impeachment does not raise the strong constitutional 
problems that notice-of-alibi statutes do, because notice-of-alibi statutes are often en-
forced by barring the defendant's alibi testimony altogether-a violation of a defendant's 
right to testify in his own behalf. Id. at 1425-26. Impeachment by prior silence at least 
allows the defendant to testify. The underlying goal of notice-of-alibi statutes, to prevent 
the prosecutor's surprise at trial and to increase prosecutorial discovery so as to assure 
truthful testimony by the defendant, is similary achieved through impeachment by si-
lence. Moreover, some notice-of-alibi laws that prevent the defendant from testifying 
preclude the impeachment by silence issue altogether. See, e.g., Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 
844, 848 (Wyo. 1978) (Raper, J., concurring) (noting that because notice-of-alibi laws 
prevent the defendant from constructing an alibi after hearing the state's case, there will 
be fewer alibi defenses and therefore Jess impeachment). Hines v. People, 179 Colo. 4, 8, 
497 P.2d 1258, 1260 (1972) (en bane) (same). 
72. Defense counsel may, and the defendant will, know of an exculpatory story long 
before trial. If the prosecutor is prepared for such testimony, he can utilize the truth 
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fendant would not be able to fabricate a story to fit the inculpa-
tory evidence presented by the government. 73 
From the defendant's perspective, allowing impeachment 
under these circumstances would not violate any constitutional 
protections. The defendant could still maintain credibility74 by 
contending that either advice of counsel, the Miranda warnings, 
or both motivated the decision to remain silent. At a minimum, 
he could raise the ambiguity of his prior silence. Thus, impeach-
ment by silence, after Miranda warnings and adequate safe-
guards, promotes both the defendant's right to a fair trial and 
the government's interest in the discovery of truth. 
The fourteenth amendment's guarantee of fairness imposes 
limits on the use of prior silence to impeach subsequent testi-
mony. When the defendant can demonstrate that an affirmative 
government act and an inducement to remain silent resulted in 
the prior silence, the court should preclude the use of prior si-
lence for impeachment. The lapse of time between the affirma-
tive government act and the silence should allow impeachment 
by prior silence when the lapse of time is accompanied by a re-
duction of pressure or the provision of counsel. These two fac-
tors enable the def endarit to make a decision about whether to 
remain silent, based on knowledge that silence may be used to 
impeach his later testimony. 
Allowing impeachment of subsequent testimony by prior si-
lence also supports the truth-testing function of the criminal 
proceeding. Defendants are encouraged to present exculpatory 
testing function of cross-examination in a more reasoned and thorough manner. Because 
trial is designed to uncover the truth, within constitutional bounds, the prosecutor 
should be privy to this evidence early to permit discovery on the validity of the exculpa-
tory story. Allowing impeachment encourages the defendant to divulge the story before 
trial, and, should he choose otherwise, affords the prosecutor at least some reasonable 
opportunity to attack the credibility of the story if he is surprised by such testimony at 
trial. See also Ayer, supra note 8, at 850 n.34, 864, 868-69. 
73. Impeachment by silence provides at least some deterrence to a defendant making 
up a story to fit within the bounds of the prosecution's case. "To allow a defendant to 
testify with impunity on matters he chooses and in a manner he chooses is a 'positive 
invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell.' " United States v. Beechum, 582 
F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). 
74. See FED. R. Evm. 608 (a)(2) (general rule on rehabilitating credibility). If the de-
fendant really remained silent because of the Miranda warnings, "he may explain that 
fact when he is on the stand." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 626 (1976) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting, joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.). The Doyle dissenters also noted that 
the risk that a truthful defendant will remain silent in reliance on the Miranda warning 
"and also will be unable to explain his honest misunderstanding is so much less than the 
risk that exclusion of the evidence will merely provide a shield for perjury that [we] 
cannot accept the Court's due process rationale." 426 U.S. at 626. 
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or mitigating testimony early, preventing later surprise and the 
tendency to modify trial testimony to support the defendant's 
interest in acquittal. Concerns for a trial both fair to the defen-
dant and likely to discover the truth support the use of the de-
fendant's prior silence to impeach subsequent testimony. 
Ill. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
In cases where the Constitution would not preclude the im-
peachment use of silence, such as a defendant's silence at a co-
defendant's trial, the only barrier to the admission of this evi-
dence would be federal or state evidentiary rules. 75 To be 
75. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam), indicates that each "[s]tate is 
entitled . . . to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution 
of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defen-
dant's own testimony." 455 U.S. at 607. And just as Fletcher leaves the post-arrest si-
lence evidentiary question in the hands of the state courts, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 
231 (1980), gives the pre-arrest silence question to the state courts. 447 U.S. at 240. 
Although most criminal cases are tried in state courts, this Note uses federal evidentiary 
analysis because federal courts have considered this problem more than any particular 
state court. And although state evidence rules sometimes differ from federal rules, fed-
eral evidence interpretations commonly serve as guides to state courts. Some states, how-
ever, may preclude their courts from following the lead of the federal rules by barring 
impeachment use of prior silence in state constitutions or statutes. 
A state constitution could prohibit impeachment by silence in two ways. Although im-
probable, a state could adopt a constitutional amendment, or, more likely, its courts 
could "interpret" the state constitution to give broader protection to defendants than 
the federal Constitution. Some state courts have so interpreted their state constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination, see State v. Roth, 549 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1977) (prohibiting impeachment by post-Miranda silence); Commonwealth v. Turner, 
499 Pa. 579, 586, 454 A.2d 537, 540 (1982) (barring impeachment by post-arrest silence 
even if Miranda warnings not given); In re Silverberg, 459 Pa. 107, 327 A.2d 106 (1974) 
(barring impeachment of attorneys at a disciplinary proceeding by use of their silence at 
a prior investigatory proceeding), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Dean v. Common-
wealth, 209 Va. 666, 166 S.E.2d 228 (1969) (barring impeachment by post-Miranda si-
lence); Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978) (prohibiting impeachment by post-
arrest silence even if Miranda warnings not given); or their due process clause, see Lee v. 
State, 422 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (prohibiting impeachment by post-
arrest silence even if Miranda warnings not given); Webb v. State, 347 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 986 (1977), to bar impeachment by 
silence. Of course, a broader protection than federal law may not be possible if the state 
constitution is virtually identical to the United States Constitution and is commonly 
interpreted in the same manner. Cf. Conyers I, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424 
N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980), decided under a state constitution that was identical to the federal 
provision, and Conyers II, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 857 (1981), barring impeachment 
by silence on purely evidentiary grounds. See also People v. Jordan, 7 Mich. App. 28, 151 
N.W.2d 242 (1967) (decided partially on Mich. Const. Art. I, §17, which is identical to 
federal fifth amendment, without citing Raffel); Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 
1984) (finding that the federal fifth amendment and the identical corresponding state 
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admissible under these rules, the evidence of prior silence to im-
peach the criminal defendant. must be more probative76 than 
prejudicial. 77 
constitutional provisions bar impeachment by silence). 
Alternatively, a state legislature could pass a statute that explicitly, or implicitly, pro-
hibits impeachment by silence. Although the Kansas Supreme Court has refused to in-
terpret either its constitution or a parallel statutory embodiment of the fifth amendment 
to bar impeachment by silence, see State v. Nott, 234 Kan. 34, 669 P.2d 660 (1983); see 
also Sanchez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (allowing impeachment, so 
implicitly deciding that neither state constitution nor state statute prohibited impeach-
ment by silence), a Michigan court has construed a statute to bar impeachment by si-
lence at a preliminary hearing. See People v. Jordan, 7 Mich. App. 28, 151 N.W.2d 242 
(1967) (barring impeachment by silence at preliminary hearing partly on Mich. Stat. 
Ann. 1962 Rev. § 27A.2159). 
The weakness in a state constitutional or statutory approach is its lack of flexibility to 
permit impeachment by silence in extraordinary cases. Although state courts have not 
grappled with this impeachment problem long, two noteworthy cases have already oc-
curred. In People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355, 320 N.E.2d 639 (1974), the defendant, a 
police officer, had a duty to tell his superiors of his activities, thereby giving his silence 
unusually high probative value. See also People v. Bowen, 65 A.D.2d 364, 411 N.Y.S.2d 
573 (1978) (same), aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 915, 409 N.E.2d 924, 431 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1980). 
Because such extraordinary cases do occur, a state evidentiary approach on a case-by-
case basis is preferable to the rigid state constitutional or statutory rules. This reasoning 
may explain why most courts have used their evidentiary rules to determine if impeach-
ment by silence is permissible. Unfortunately, many state courts adopting the eviden-
tiary approach have not followed the more considered approach of the federal courts 
when applying evidentiary principles. See Lee v. State, 422 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1982) (barring impeachment by post-arrest silence); Phillips v. State, 165 Ga. App. 
235, 299 S.E.2d 138 (1983) (same); People v. Beller, 74 Ill. 2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857 (1979) 
(barring impeachment by post-arrest silence even if Miranda warnings are not given); 
State v. Williams, 182 N.J. Super. 427, 442 A.2d 620 (App. Div. 1982) (finding that the 
refusal to testify was not "testimony" under N.J.R. Evm. 63 (l)(a)); Conyers II, 52 
N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 857 (1981) (barring impeachment by post-arrest silence). But see 
State v. Nott, 234 Kan. 34, 669 P.2d 660 (1983) (allowing impeachment but not using 
federal approach); Sanchez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (same). 
76. Probative is used here as synonymous with "relevant," as defined in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, FED. R. Evm. 401. Prior silence may be probative in a number of 
different contexts, but the most common are: (1) to suggest that the trial testimony is a 
recent fabrication, see Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (noting that self-defense not 
claimed until trial); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616 (1976) (reiterating the prosecutor's 
claim that the defendant fabricated a story to "fit within the seams of the State's case as 
it was developed at pretrial hearings"); (2) as an adopted admission by silence, see 
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975); (3) as a tacit admission, see Gamble, The 
Tacit Admission Rule: Unreliable and Unconstitutional-A Doctrine Ripe for Aban-
donment, 14 GA. L. REV. 27 (1979); and (4) as a prior inconsistent statement, see State v. 
Nott, 234 Kan. 34, 669 P.2d 660 (1983). 
77. To be unfairly prejudicial, the evidence of silence must raise the danger of unduly 
arousing the jury's emotions of prejudice, hostility or sympathy. One court finding of 
prejudicial impact observed that "[w]e would be naive if we failed to recognize that most 
laymen view an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as a badge of guilt." Walker 
v. United States, 404 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1968). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the danger of prejudice must substantially outweigh probative value before exclusion is 
appropriate. See FED. R. Evm. 403. 
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Courts, in weighing the probative value and the prejudicial ef-
fect of evidence of prior silence to impeach subsequent testi-
mony, must consider several factors. Silence occurring after ar-
rest, while the defendant is subject to the pressures of custodial 
investigation, may have limited probative value for impeach-
ment of subsequent testimony. Silence may also occur at judicial 
proceedings prior to trial, such as before a grand jury, at a pre-
liminary hearing, or at a severed trial of a codefendant. Unlike 
the passive post-arrest refusal to answer questions without the 
advice of counsel, silence in a judicial proceeding prior to the 
defendant's trial involves the invocation of the fifth amendment 
right to remain silent. This distinction requires separate consid-
eration in an analysis of the use of silence to impeach testimony. 
In addition to the nature of the prior silence, the nature of the 
subsequent testimony and the type of criminal proceeding where 
the silence occurs influences the admissibility of the prior 
silence. 
A. The Nature of the Silence 
Applying the standard that evidence must be more probative 
than prejudicial, federal com::ts have focused on the ambiguity of 
silence in determining whether silence actually conflicts with the 
trial testimony. 
In United States v. Hale,78 the Supreme Court, acting in its 
supervisory capacity over federal courts,79 relied on common law 
evidentiary grounds80 to forbid the impeachment use of silence 
occurring at the time of arrest. The Hale Court doubted the pro-
bative value of silence that occurs immediately following arrest, 
suggesting that it may result from intimidation by the situation, 
confusion about what is being asked under such stressful condi-
tions, fear of police, unwillingness to incriminate another, or a 
response to the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere of 
detention.81 Decided shortly after Hale, Doyle reiterated the evi-
dentiary finding that silence following arrest and Miranda warn-
78. 422 U.S. 171 (1975). 
79. Because the Court decided Hale in its supervisory capacity over federal courts, 
the case does not bind state courts. 422 U.S. at 181. 
80. The Court decided Hale on June 23, 1975, eight days before the Federal Rules of 
Evidence became effective. Thus, Hale relied heavily on Wigmore's evidence treatise. See 
422 U.S. at 176. Wigmore's analysis "allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previ-
ous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been 
asserted." 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). 
81. 422 U.S. at 177. 
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ings may be "insolubly ambiguous."82 This ambiguity results be-
cause the Miranda warnings provide at least one motivation for 
remaining silent that is consistent with innocence. 83 One court 
has noted that there exists an underlying ambiguity in all post-
arrest silence, because even without the Miranda warnings an 
arrestee may be motivated to remain silent, withholding his ex-
culpatory story, in anticipation of a more receptive audi-
ence-such as a judge, jury, or lawyer-than the arresting of-
ficer.84 The several possible reasons for silence immediately 
following arrest may preclude its use for impeachment of subse-
quent trial testimony. 
B. Post-Arrest Silence and the Invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment 
Although a defendant's silence at a prior judicial proceeding 
does not mean that his testimony at his own trial is per se in-
consistent with the prior silence,811 invocation of the fifth amend-
ment at a prior trial does not present the same ambiguities as 
silence immediately after arrest. An active assertion of the fifth 
amendment in response to a prosecutor's question presents less 
ambiguity than a passive assertion-in effect, silence-for a 
number of reasons. First, because an active assertion of the fifth 
amendment occurs in the face of direct accusation, the inference 
of guilt is stronger than that drawn from the passive assertion of 
silence in response to detention. 86 Second, the nature of the 
prosecutor's question may narrowly limit the inferences that can 
be drawn from an active assertion of the fifth amendment. Con-
sequently, an active assertion of the fifth amendment, at a prior 
judicial proceeding, followed by an alibi defense asserted in re-
sponse to the same question at the defendant's subsequent trial, 
may be enough to raise an inference of prior inconsistent state-
ments. Passive post-arrest silence followed by an alibi defense, 
82. 426 U.S. at 617. Hale also noted that silence at the time of arrest may be inher-
ently ambiguous without Miranda warnings. 422 U.S. at 177. 
83. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 n.8 (1976); but see 426 U.S. at 621 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that Miranda warnings do not lessen the probative value of the 
silence when used for impeachment purposes). 
84. See supra notes 67-69. 
85. See Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 5 (1961). 
86. Of course, passive silence can be a response to accusation, such as during custo-
dial interrogation. Police reports, however, commonly omit the exact questions asked, so 
silence is more probative for impeachment purposes in the active assertion context partly 
because a record exists of the hearing or trial. 
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however, might not raise such an inference of inconsistent 
statements. 
C. The Trial Testimony 
The nature of silence, however, is only part of the inquiry. In-
consistency also depends on the defendant's trial testimony. 
Both exculpatory ·explanations and mitigating excuses implicate 
the defendant in the crime charged. The defendant has little in-
centive to volunteer such incriminating admissions. But incon-
sistency is more likely when a defendant offers a complete alibi, 
or flatly denies the charge, because presumably the defendant 
has a stronger incentive to volunteer his favorable account ear-
lier than at trial to convince the prosecutor to halt the criminal 
proceedings. Therefore, an active invocation of the fifth amend-
ment followed by an alibi is the most probative evidence for im-
peachment by prior silence. 
D. The Nature of the Tribunal 
The Court has also noted that "the nature of the tribunal 
which subjects the witness to questioning bears heavily on what 
inferences can be drawn from a plea of the Fifth Amendment. "87 
Unfortunately, the Court has not clarified the relevance of this 
inquiry. In Hale it merely concluded that the "inherent pres-
sures of in-custody interrogation exceed those of questioning 
before a grand jury and compound the difficulty of identifying 
the reason for silence. "88 
A defendant's active invocation of the fifth amendment before 
a grand jury, however, will not always be inconsistent with his 
subsequent trial testimony. Indeed, in Grunewald v. United 
States,89 the Court prohibited impeachment use of a defen-
dant's00 silence at a codefendant's prior grand jury proceeding. 
Although the outcome in Grunewald was based primarily on the 
factual determination that the subsequent exculpatory trial tes-
87. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 422 (1957). 
88. 422 U.S. at 177. 
89. 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
90. Although the witness had not been formally charged when he was questioned at 
Grunewald's grand jury proceeding, "[the witness] was quite evidently already consid-
ered a potential defendant." 353 U.S. at 423. 
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timony was not inconsistent with the grand jury silence,91 the 
Court also focused on the nature of a grand jury proceeding. 
Grand juries are secretive and investigative: 
Innocent men are more likely to [remain silent] in secret 
proceedings, where they testify without advice of counsel 
and without opportunity for cross-examination, than in 
open court proceedings, where cross-examination and ju-
dicially supervised procedures provide safeguards for the 
establishing of the whole, as against the possibility of 
merely partial, truth. 92 
The procedural differences between the prior trial of a codefen-
dant and either a grand jury proceeding or an arrest of the de-
fendant safeguard the defendant from making a rushed, unin-
formed choice to remain silent. Thus, impeachment of such 
silence should be allowed. 
E. Rehabilitating the Defendant Impeached by Post-
Miranda Silence 
If impeached by his silence as a witness at a prior trial, a de-
fendant will probably not try to rehabilitate his credibility by 
claiming that the Miranda warnings caused his silence.93 At a 
preliminary hearing or a codefendant's prior trial, the presence 
of a judge assures the defendant of a more impartial listener 
than the arresting officer or prosecutor,94 and thereby reduces 
the incentive to remain silent. Defense counsel may even be pre-
sent at the codefendant's prior trial, especially if subsequent im-
peachment is a possibility. After such safeguards are present, 
continued reliance on Miranda seems dubious. 
The defendant has an incentive to attribute his prior silence 
to the advice of counsel.96 Counsel's advice may be based on a 
91. 353 U.S. at 421-22. 
92. Id. at 422-23. 
93. Relying on the Miranda warnings as a basis for silence, long after the warnings 
were given and after advice from counsel, strains legitimacy because Miranda warnings 
were designed primarily, if not exclusively, to inform an arrestee of his rights at the time 
following arrest when he has few other procedural protections. See, e.g., supra notes 63-
69 and accompanying text. Although a defendant may show that the Miranda warnings 
were a subjective reason for his silence in an effort to rehabilitate his credibility, the 
admissibility and, to an extent, the weight the jury gives the evidence of silence will turn 
on its objective reasonableness. 
94. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
95. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 632 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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variety of legal and tactical considerations that outweigh the de-
fendant's desire to present his story.96 Nevertheless, Hale recog-
nized that prior silence gains probative value when the silence 
occurs in the face of accusation. 97 As a result, silence may be 
found to be inconsistent with subsequent trial testimony despite 
the advice of counsel. Silence in response to specific questions 
posed at a codefendant's prior trial is the most probative evi-
dence of self-contradiction,98 although the degree of inconsis-
tency will depend on the defendant's trial testimony and the 
facts of the given case. 99 
Several factors influence the determination of whether the 
probative value of prior silence outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
Passive post-arrest silence has less probative value than does an 
active invocation of the fifth amendment. Silence in the face of 
general questions likewise has less probative value than silence 
in the face of a direct accusation of guilt. The type of tribunal at 
which the prior silence occurred influences the weighing of the 
probative and prejudicial nature of the silence for impeachment. 
The nature of the subsequent testimony offered by the defen-
96. But to be perceived as a reasonable argument, silence due to advice of counsel 
may have to be accompanied by an explanation of why counsel advised the defendant to 
remain silent, which in turn may reflect why defendant's testimony would have tended to 
incriminate him. 
97. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975); see also United States ex 
rel. Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651, 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983) 
(stating that a defendant who took the stand on his own behalf, "by assigning a reason 
for silence immediately after arrest, chose to indicate to the jury that silence had proba-
tive weight and removed that subject from the realm of insoluble ambiguity about which 
there could be no comment."). This notion of increased probative value in the face of 
accusation presents a problem in those states or federal courts that still compel a witness 
to take the stand and assert the privilege for specific questions. The more specific the 
prosecutor's questions, the more probative the silence will be deemed. Such a 
prosecutorial tactic may be limited, however, because the more specific a question is, the 
more it may prejudice a defendant by implying guilt. 
98. "[T]he context in which a question is asked imparts additional meaning to the 
question, and clarifies what information is sought. A question to which a claim of the 
privilege is interposed must be considered 'in the setting in which it is asked.' " Zicarelli 
v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 480 (1972) (quoting Hoffman v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)). 
One could raise the counterargument that a defendant would naturally present an ex-
culpatory story when his freedom was at stake, as in his own trial, but not when his 
freedom was not directly at stake, as in his preliminary hearing or a prior codefendant's 
trial. See Note, supra note 56, at 638. This analysis, however, fails to recognize that a 
defendant would likely present his exculpatory story at the preliminary hearing "to per-
suade the prosecution to dismiss the charges in advance of trial." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 
610, 632 n.10 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
99. The trial judge must determine whether there is a sufficient inconsistency for the 
evidence of silence to be admitted, see FED. R. Evm. 104(a), leaving the weight of the 
inconsistency and its impeachment value to the jury. 
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dant also affects whether prior silence should be admitted for 
impeachment. Silence will, in most instances, have sufficient 
probative value that the court should allow its admission to im-
peach subsequent testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Constitution both permits and restricts the 
use of a defendant's prior silence to impeach his testimony at his 
own trial. The Raffel waiver rule terminates the protection of 
the fifth amend~ent when the defendant voluntarily takes the 
stand at his own trial, and the fairness requirement of the four-
teenth amendment due process clause forbids the use of silence 
resulting from an affirmative government inducement. The gov-
ernment inducement to remain silent, which may be caused by 
the shock of arrest, the fearful nature of custody, the Miranda 
warnings, or any combination thereof, will gradually lose its in-
fluence on the defendant as pressure is diminished and advice of 
counsel obtained. In this context, impeachment by prior silence 
becomes fair. No constitutional barriers to impeachment by 
prior silence exist if the foregoing procedural safeguards provide 
the defendant an unpressured and informed environment in 
which to choose to remain silent. Therefore, admissibility must 
be determined by applying evidentiary rules to the facts of the 
particular case. 
Recognizing the defendant's incentive to distort the facts, trial 
judges already admit most other relevant impeachment evi-
dence, allowing the jury to assess the credibility and demeanor 
of the witness. The defendant, of course, may rehabilitate his 
credibility by showing that prior silence is consistent with his 
testimony. But only by allowing prior silence as evidence of im-
peachment will the jury be fully informed and able to accurately 
assess the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony. Within the 
rules of evidence, the defendant as a witness for himself must be 
impeachable like any other witness, and prior silence is a proper 
and valuable piece of information in making this determination. 
-Rex A. Sharp 
